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Abstract
Visual attention is captured by physically salient stimuli (termed salience-based attentional capture), and by otherwise task-
irrelevant stimuli that contain goal-related features (termed contingent attentional capture). Recently, we reported that
physically nonsalient stimuli associated with value through reward learning also capture attention involuntarily (Anderson,
Laurent, & Yantis, PNAS, 2011). Although it is known that physical salience and goal-relatedness both influence attentional
priority, it is unknown whether or how attentional capture by a salient stimulus is modulated by its associated value. Here
we show that a physically salient, task-irrelevant distractor previously associated with a large reward slows visual search
more than an equally salient distractor previously associated with a smaller reward. This magnification of salience-based
attentional capture by learned value extinguishes over several hundred trials. These findings reveal a broad influence of
learned value on involuntary attentional capture.
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Introduction
Objects in the visual world compete for perceptual represen-
tation in the mind and brain. Selective attention resolves this
competition, biasing perception in favor of behaviorally relevant
and salient stimuli [1–4]. Because perception is limited in its
representational capacity, which stimuli are selected by attention
has important implications for the survival and well-being of an
organism.
Attentional selection can proceed either voluntarily, according
to context-specific goals and priorities, or involuntarily, according
to the physical properties of a stimulus within a given task context.
When a stimulus is selected via attention involuntarily, that
stimulus is said to have captured attention. Attentional capture can
be adaptive when a stimulus signals danger or opportunity [5], but
comes at a cost in performance when those stimuli distract from
ongoing goal-related processes.
It is well established that both physical salience and ongoing task
goals influence the attentional priority of a stimulus. Physically
salient but task-irrelevant stimuli slow visual search for a target in a
spatially-specific manner (e.g., [6–10]); this is termed salience-based
attentional capture. Irrelevant stimuli possessing goal-related features
also capture attention involuntarily; for example, a red distractor
captures attention when the searched-for target stimulus is partly
defined by the color red [11,12]. This is termed contingent attentional
capture [13].
Salience-based and contingent attentional capture are known to
jointly determine attentional priority. For example, contingent
attentional capture is more pronounced for more salient
distractors, even when the target of visual search is nonsalient
[14]. These and related findings suggest that stimulus salience and
ongoing task goals have a combined influence on attentional
priority.
Physical salience and goal-relevance are not the only properties
that influence attentional priority, however. A growing body of
evidence has established that reward-related stimuli compete
effectively for perceptual representation [15–27]. Attention to
reward-related stimuli is often explicitly a behavioral goal; it is
therefore necessary to design task contingencies such that it is
possible to distinguish between the voluntary and involuntary
deployment of attention to valuable stimuli [28].
Recently, we reported that otherwise nonsalient and task-
irrelevant stimuli that had previously been associated with reward
capture attention involuntarily [29]. In a training phase, partici-
pants received a monetary reward for identifying an oriented bar
contained within a target stimulus that was unpredictably red or
green; the target appeared in an array of other differently-colored
items. Both high and low amounts of reward were given as
feedback following each trial; one target color was associated with
a high probability of a large reward while the other was associated
with a high probability of a small reward. Thus, the amount of
reward delivered on a given trial was not associated with a
particular motor response, but was probabilistically related to the
color of the target stimulus. Following the training phase, parti-
cipants engaged in a test phase in which they searched for a shape-
singleton target in extinction; no rewards were given, and color
was irrelevant to the task. On half the trials, one of the nontarget
items was rendered in the color of a formerly rewarded stimulus.
Critically, the nontarget items were all differently colored, making
the shape-singleton target the most physically salient stimulus in
the display. The results revealed that distractors rendered in
formerly rewarded colors consistently slowed visual search in a
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irrelevant, and did not share any identifying features in common
with the target [29]. This finding demonstrates that valuable
stimuli capture attention involuntarily, in a manner that is distinct
from other mechanisms of attentional control.
Although there is ample evidence that salience-based and
contingency-based mechanisms of attentional control jointly
determine attentional priority, it is unknown whether or how
salience-based attentional priority is modulated by the learned
value of a stimulus. This is an important question, as ecologically
valuable stimuli are often visually salient. One possibility is that the
attentional priority of a salient stimulus cannot be modulated by
learned value, either because its priority is already maximal or
because value and salience provide redundant information about
attentional priority. Another possibility, however, is that stimulus
salience and stimulus value combine to determine attentional
priority, much as salience increases the attentional priority of goal-
related stimuli in contingent capture [14]; this would result in a
value-driven increase in attentional priority above and beyond that
afforded by physical salience alone. Such a value-driven increase
in attentional priority could either operate at the level of selection,
effectively increasing salience, or at the post-selection level by
prolonging attentional dwell time following purely salience-driven
capture. In the present study, we distinguish between these two
competing possibilities, and conclude that stimulus salience and
stimulus value have combined effects on attentional priority.
Experiment 1
The design of Experiment 1 was similar to that of Anderson
et al. [29]. During the training phase, participants searched for a
red or green target among differently colored nontargets
(Figure 1a), and received visual feedback at the end of each trial
indicating a monetary reward for a correct response; one of the
two colors was associated with a high reward and the other with a
low reward. During the test phase, which utilizes a variant of the
additional singleton paradigm (e.g., [6,9,30]), participants
searched for a unique shape in an array of usually all white
elements (Figure 1b). On half the trials, one of the nontarget
elements, the distractor, was rendered in red or green. Participants
were informed that color was irrelevant and should be ignored,
and the target was never red or green. No reward was provided
during the test phase.
Color-singleton distractors capture attention robustly in a
shape-search task by virtue of their physical salience (e.g.,
[6,9,30]). Our primary focus here was to determine whether a
salient high-value distractor would capture attention more robustly
than a salient low-value distractor. If salience completely
dominates value, then high- and low-value color singletons should
produce similar slowing in visual search. If learned value combines
with physical salience, then the formerly high-reward distractors
should slow responses more than formerly low-reward distractors.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Eighteen participants were recruited from the
Johns Hopkins University community. All were screened for
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and color vision.
Participants were provided monetary compensation that varied
between $21 and $28 (mean=$25.22), depending on their
accuracy. All participants read and signed an informed consent
form prior to participating in the experiments. Throughout the
research project leading to this publication, the rights of the
participants were protected and the applicable guidelines
concerning the use of human subjects for the purposes of
research were followed. The study was approved by the Johns
Hopkins University Institutional Review Board.
Apparatus and Stimuli. A Mac Mini equipped with Matlab
software and Psychophysics Toolbox extensions was used to
present the stimuli on a Dell P991 monitor. The participants
viewed the monitor from a distance of approximately 50 cm in a
dimly lit room.
The sequence of events and time course for the training and test
phases are shown in Figure 1a and 1b, respectively. Each trial
consisted of three displays: a fixation display, a search display, and
a feedback display. During both the training and test phases, the
fixation display consisted of a white fixation cross (.5u6.5u visual
angle) presented in the center of the screen against a black
background, and the search display consisted of the fixation cross
surrounded by six shapes (2.3u62.3u visual angle) placed at equal
intervals along an imaginary circle with a 5u radius.
Training Phase: During the training phase, the six shapes that
comprised the search display were all circles of different colors
(red, green, blue, cyan, pink, orange, yellow, and white). Targets
were defined as either a red or green circle, one of which was
presented on every trial in a randomly-selected location. Inside the
target shape, a white line segment was oriented either vertically or
horizontally, and inside each of the nontarget shapes, a white line
segment was tilted at 45u to the left or to the right. The feedback
display informed participants of the reward earned on the current
trial, as well as total reward accumulated thus far.
Figure 1. Behavioral Task. Sequence of events and time course for a trial during training (a) and at test (b) in Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027926.g001
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of a white circle among white diamonds or a white diamond
among white circles, and the target on each trial was defined as the
unique shape. On a randomly-selected half of the trials, one of the
nontarget elements, the distractor, was rendered in red or green
(equally often). The feedback display at test only informed
participants whether their response on the current trial was
correct.
Design. The experiment consisted of a single session of 1008
training trials followed by 480 test trials. Participants were
provided with 50 practice trials prior to the training phase, and
20 practice trials prior to the test phase. After every 100 trials and
between the two phases, participants were provided with a short
break. Target identity, target location, distractor color, and
distractor location were fully crossed and counterbalanced, and
trials were presented in a random order.
Correct responses in the training phase were followed by visual
feedback indicating monetary reward. High-reward targets were
followed by high-reward feedback ($0.05) on 80% of trials and
low-reward feedback ($0.01) on the remaining 20%; for low-
reward targets, the percentages were reversed. High-reward
targets were red for half of the participants, and green for the
other half. No reward feedback was provided during the initial
practice block, and no reward feedback was provided during the
test phase. Upon completion of the experiment, participants were
given the cumulative reward they had earned.
Procedure. Each participant performed the experiment
individually over the course of a single two-hour session. Each
session took place inside a dimly lit laboratory room. The experi-
menter familiarized all participants with each task by providing
written and oral descriptions of the stimuli and procedures.
Participants were instructed to respond ‘‘as quickly as possible
while minimizing errors.’’
Each trial began with the presentation of the fixation display for
a randomly varying interval of 400, 500, or 600 ms. The search
display then appeared and remained on screen until a response
was made or the trial timed out. The training task was performed
under time pressure, with trials terminating after 600 ms; during
test, time pressure was lifted by lengthening this time limit to
1500 ms.
Participants made a forced-choice target identification by
pressing the ‘‘z’’ and the ‘‘m’’ keys for the vertically and hori-
zontally orientated targets, respectively. Response time (RT) was
measured from the onset of the target display until a response was
made or the trial timed out. The computer emitted a 500 ms
1000 Hz feedback tone to inform the participant when a trial
timed out. Only correct responses were included in the analysis,
and all RTs more than three standard deviations above and below
the mean of their respective conditions were excluded from the
analysis.
Results and Discussion
During training, mean RT to high- and low-reward targets did
not differ significantly, although there was a trend toward faster
responses to the target color associated with high reward, suggest-
ing increased attentional priority [mean difference=3.4 ms,
t(17)=1.57, p=.135]. To assess how the effect of reward on
target selection changed over the course of the training phase, we
analyzed the data from the training phase separately in ten bins of
roughly 100 trials each. There was no interaction between reward
and trial bin [F(9,153)=1.43, p=.179], indicating that the
influence of reward on RT did not change significantly over time.
The main effect of trial bin was significant [F(9,153)=4.92,
p,.001, gp
2=.224], however, showing that participants generally
responded faster with more experience. The data for the training
phase are presented in Figure 2.
Of particular interest were the data from the test phase.
Reward-color mapping (i.e., red vs. green as the high-reward color
in the training phase) did not interact with the effect of value on
performance in the test phase (F,1), so further analyses collapsed
across color. Response times (RTs) in the test phase differed
significantly in the three distractor conditions [Figure 3,
F(2,34)=48.57, p,.001, gp
2=.741]. Planned comparisons con-
firmed that both the high-value and low-value distractors slowed
RT compared to when no distractor was presented [t(17)=8.45,
p,.001, d=1.99 and t(17)=6.31, p,.001, d=1.47, respectively].
This replicates many previous demonstrations of attentional
capture by irrelevant but physically salient feature singletons
(e.g., [6,7]).
We next examined the effect of reward history on performance
in the test phase. High-value distractors slowed RT significantly
more than did low-value distractors [t(17)=3.37, p=.004, d=.81].
This modulation of attentional capture by reward history cannot
be attributed to differences in physical salience, and occurred
despite the irrelevance of the color items to the shape-search task.
To assess how the effect of reward history on attentional capture
Figure 2. Behavioral Results for the Training Phase of Experiment 1. Mean response time 6 within-subjects s.e.m. for high- and low-reward
targets over the course of the training phase. Only the main effect of trial block was significant [F(9,153)=4.92, p,.001, gp
2=.224].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027926.g002
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from the test phase separately in four equally-sized 120-trial bins.
The effect of learned value on performance gradually extinguished
over the course of the unrewarded test trials, as revealed by a
linear trend in the difference between RTs for high- and low-
value distractor trials over trial bin [F(1,17)=17.22, p=.001,
gp
2=.503]. There was no significant difference in error rates
between the three distractor conditions (Table 1, F,1).
These results reveal that learned value magnifies attentional
capture by salient stimuli. As the learned stimulus-value associa-
tions extinguished in the absence of reward, so did the effect of
reward history on performance. However, extinction occurred
gradually over many trials, resulting in a robust effect of prior
reward on involuntary attention allocation for the first several
hundred trials of the test phase. Taken together, these results
provide strong evidence that learned value can magnify the effect
of physical salience on attentional priority.
Experiment 2
Despite the fact that attentional capture in Experiment 1 was
significantly modulated by value, it could be that the effect of value
on salience-based attentional capture was not critically dependent
upon a learned association between stimuli and prior reward.
Instead, it is possible that participants continued to maintain a
search set for the training-phase target colors even in the test
phase. Although it is known that participants can rapidly adjust
task-related attentional priorities with changing task demands [31],
former targets can continue to draw attention under certain
conditions [32,33]. Thus, it is important to rule out this possible
explanation of our results.
We tested eighteen new participants who engaged in a training
phase that was similar to that used in Experiment 1, with two
critical differences. First, no reward feedback was provided during
training or at any point during the experiment; instead,
participants were compensated with a flat rate that matched the
average earnings of participants in the main experiment ($25).
Second, targets were now either red or blue (with green occurring
as one of the nontargets) for half of the participants, and green or
blue (with red occurring as one of the nontargets) for the other
participants. The test phase for all participants was identical to
that of Experiment 1. Thus, in the test phase, one color-singleton
distractor had been a target color during the training phase, and
the other color-singleton distractor had always been a nontarget
color. If persisting priority for a former target color alone drove
our main findings, we would expect an equally large – or indeed
even larger – difference in RT on trials containing the color
distractor that was used as a target during training versus trials
containing the color distractor that was never used as a target
during training.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Eighteen participants were recruited from the
Johns Hopkins University community. All were screened for
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and color vision.
Participants were compensated with $25. None of the participants
had participated in Experiment 1.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were
identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. Targets
during training were either a blue or green circle (for half of the
participants), or a blue or red circle. On half of the trials
containing each target color, one of the nontarget-colored items
was colored either red (for participants searching for green and
blue targets) or green (for participants searching for red and blue
targets). The feedback display during training only informed
participants whether their previous response was correct.
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure were
identical to Experiment 1, with the exception that no monetary
reward feedback was provided.
Results and Discussion
Distractors at test were classified as being either the color of a
former target or the color of a former nontarget. During the test
phase, responses were significantly slowed by both former target-
colored and former nontarget-colored distractors [Figure 4,
t(17)=7.27, p,.001, d=1.71 and t(17)=6.13, p,.001, d=1.44,
respectively]. However, we observed no difference in RT between
those two distractor conditions [Table 1, t(17)=0.34, p=.740].
The magnitude of slowing caused by the former target color
Figure 3. Behavioral Results for the Test Phase of Experiment
1. Mean response time 6 within-subjects s.e.m. for each distractor
condition over the course of the test phase. The difference in RT on
trials containing a high-value vs. a low-value distractor represents the
effect of learned value on salience-driven attentional capture.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027926.g003





None Low-Value High-Value None Non-Target Colored Target Colored
655(5.5) 710(3.9) 728(3.8) 588(3.6) 632(4.1) 634(4.8)
.09(.003) .10(.004) .10(.005) .11(.003) .13(.005) .13(.005)
Error terms, in parentheses, reflect the within-subjects standard error of the mean (s.e.m.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027926.t001
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in contrast to Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, there was no
significant difference in error rates among the three conditions
[Table 1, F(2,34)=2.20, p=.127].
The slowing caused by the high-value distractor in Experiment
1 was significantly greater than that caused by the former target-
colored distractor in Experiment 2 [mean difference=27 ms,
t(34)=2.29, p=.025, d=.79]. This outcome demonstrates that
value associations are necessary to produce the modulation of
distraction observed in Experiment 1, and that this modulation
cannot be explained merely in terms of a persisting intention to
search for former targets.
General Discussion
It is well established that physical salience and ongoing task
goals influence attentional priority involuntarily (e.g., [6,13]), and
recent research indicates that the learned value of a stimulus also
plays a direct role in determining its attentional priority [29].
Although salience-based and contingency-based mechanisms of
attentional control are known to jointly influence attentional
priority, it is unknown whether attentional priority to salient
stimuli is similarly modulated by learned value. In the present
study, we addressed this question and show that the physical
salience and learned value of a stimulus have a combined effect on
attentional priority, with learned value increasing attentional
priority above and beyond the level afforded by salience alone.
Our results demonstrate that a salient but otherwise neutral
stimulus, when previously associated with high reward, magnifies
distraction even after that stimulus no longer predicts reward. This
finding cannot be attributed to differences in physical salience, and
Experiment 2 rules out persisting intention to search for a former
target as an explanation. Instead, our results reveal a broad
influence of learned value in determining attentional priority, one
that combines with salience-based mechanisms of attentional
control such that more valuable stimuli receive increased
attentional priority in addition to the priority afforded by their
physical salience.
Navalpakkam et al. [22] showed that attentional selection
reflects an optimal weighting of the conspicuity of a stimulus
afforded by its physical salience and its associated reward value,
suggesting that value-based and salience-based attentional priority
can be independently adjusted according to the relative impor-
tance of each factor given the demands of the task. There are
multiple mechanisms through which value and salience might be
combined in order to jointly determine attentional priority in this
way. One is that learned value directly modulates the visual
salience or pertinence [34] of reward-associated stimulus features,
thereby increasing their attentional priority. This possibility is
supported by evidence showing that reward-associated stimulus
features are represented more robustly in early visual areas of the
brain [25,26]. Another possibility is that the learned value of
stimuli increases attentional dwell time – that is, the time required
to disengage attention after it has been captured [7,35,36].
However, we have previously shown that the learned value of
stimuli is sufficient to drive attention allocation in the absence of
prior attentional capture on that trial by salience or goal-
relevance; similar value-driven slowing of response time has been
reported for nonsalient stimuli as well [29]. Thus, although a post-
capture dwell time account of value-based attentional priority is
plausible and cannot be ruled out in the present study, it does not
provide a complete account of how learned value is known to
influence attention. A third possibility is that associating targets
with value causes individuals to perseverate with goal-related
priorities that have been rewarded previously. This could be
likened to contingent attentional capture on the basis of a reward-
motivated goal state that cannot be easily overcome by virtue of its
association with reward. However, because attention to valuable
stimuli ran counter the goals of the task in the test phase, it is clear
that the reported effects on attentional priority reflect an
involuntary modulation of attentional priority by previous reward
history.
Our results contribute to a growing body of work that highlights
an important role for reward in perception and attention [15–
27,29]. Attentional priority to reward-related stimuli will often be
adaptive, serving to maximize reward procurement. However, an
inability to ignore formerly rewarding stimuli that run counter to
current behavioral goals, such as desired abstinence from a drug of
abuse, can be highly maladaptive. In this way, the value-based
modulation of attention may play a key role in a variety of clinical
syndromes in which both attention and reward have been critically
implicated, including drug addiction [37–39], obesity [40],
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder [41], and obsessive-com-
pulsive disorder [42]. All four of these conditions are highly
comorbid [41,42], suggesting a common underlying mechanism
that may be related to susceptibility to the value-based modulation
of attentional priority.
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